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Abstract—Cyber attacks and malware are now more prevalent
than ever and the trend is ever upward. There have been
several approaches to attack detection including resident software
applications at the root or user level, e.g., virus detection, and
modifications to the OS, e.g., encryption, application signing, etc.
Some approaches have moved to lower level detection and preven-
tion, e.g., Data Execution Prevention. An emerging approach in
countermeasure development is the use of hardware performance
counters existing in the micro-architecture of modern processors.
These are at the lowest level, implemented in processor hardware,
and the wealth of data collected by these counters affords some
very promising countermeasures with minimal overhead as well
as protection from being sabotaged themselves by attackers. Here,
we conduct a survey of recent techniques in realizing effective
countermeasures for cyber attack detection from these hardware
performance counters.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber security has been at the forefront of mainstream media
for several years now as a critical problem for our society to
overcome. Attackers are increasingly motivated and enabled
to compromise software and computing infrastructure. Cyber
security countermeasures are of prime interest in mitigating
such attacks and associated malware.
There are many types of countermeasures that are built as
software applications, e.g., virus checkers, based on control-
ling physical access, e.g., biometrics, or enforced as policies,
etc. Our investigation is to survey the state of the art in the
utilization of Hardware Performance Counters (HPC) to build
cyber security countermeasures. HPCs are a promising new
resource to address the limitations of typical software, and
other countermeasures.
Hardware performance counters are special purpose registers
and logic incorporated in the micro-architecture of modern
processors and CPUs. They are typically used as debugging
tools that run at the lowest level, i.e., on chip, for performance
tuning and analysis by collecting information on processor
events and the running processes. As the name implies, HPCs
are used to count events, such as cache misses, and aid in
timing events, such as counting CPU cycles per unit time.
This information that is typically used to debug software can
now also be used to detect cyber attacks. Their residence in
micro-architecture, i.e., in silicon, is a safeguard against their
tampering.
A. Recent Related Surveys
Several related surveys have been performed, e.g., [1] exam-
ines the feasibility of using HPCs to detect malware with
several specific examples of HPC data triggers and detection
techniques, and others that focus on Control Flow Integrity[2]
(CFI), hardware trojans[3], and side-channel timing attacks[4].
Our survey updates the current state of knowledge and focuses
on HPCs in particular, examining several examples and cate-
gorizing them by method and attack vector.
B. Using Hardware Performance Counters as Countermea-
sures
Hardware performance counters afford a highly granular and
low footprint method of detecting anomalous behavior. HPCs
reside on the processor chip, implemented in dedicated hard-
ware, so they typically consume minimal resources from
the processor. Their inclusion by major processor vendors
alleviates the need to develop custom IP cores for cyber attack
detection. HPCs collect a wealth of information such as cache
misses, event timing, branch mis/predictions, etc. about the
running processes. They also execute at the kernel/hardware
privilege level, and are difficult to spoof or sabotage by attack-
ers due to their physical persistence in the micro-architecture.
Table #1 lists some of the commonly used HPCs. Many
additional HPCs are available depending on the processor
manufacturer, e.g., Intel[5]. This table is more thoroughly
discussed with supporting data collected from anomaly testing
in [6].
The perf utility in Linux is an example method of access.
Direct access through machine coding, e.g., inline in C, and
custom monitoring software are possible as well. Software
development tools should allow HPCs to be activated without
source code modification or in some cases rebuilding. In this
case, HPCs are in contrast to code instrumentation as they exist
to passively and externally monitor the processor behavior.
The wealth of data from HPCs lends itself to the discovery of
anomalous behavior that is an indicator of a potential attack.
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TABLE I
TYPICAL HARDWARE PERFORMANCE COUNTERS, adapted from [6].
cpu-cycles L1-dcache-loads dTLB-loads
branches L1-dcache-stores iTLB-loads
instructions L1-icache-loads dTLB-load-misses
branch-misses L1-icache-load-misses iTLB-load-misses
branch-loads LLC-loads dTLB-stores
branch-load-misses LLC-load-misses dTLB-store-misses
cache-references LLC-stores
cache-misses LLC-store-misses
ref-cycles
bus-cycles
HPCs employ one or more of the approaches in detecting
attacks.
1) Signature based: HPCs collect information about the
suspect process and determine if this information cor-
responds to either known attacks, e.g., blacklist, or
known safe applications, e.g., whitelist. This is similar
to approaches used by many virus scanning applications.
The whitelist, if practical, has the added benefit of
denying any activity that has not been validated, thus
mitigating unknown and zero day attacks.
2) Heuristic based: HPCs monitor the suspect process to
determine if behavior is anomalous, such as if there are
a high number of cache misses or a high number of
branch mis-predictions (above a heuristic threshold) to
indicate a potential attack.
3) Advanced approaches: HPC data are analyzed and used
in more advanced statistical analysis, machine learning,
or other artificial intelligence approaches with super-
vised or unsupervised learning.
4) Hybrid approaches: A combination of one or more of
these, possibly also in cooperation with other security
countermeasures.
5) Context sensitivity: In addition to monitoring blacklist,
whitelist, and heuristic behavior, the context in which the
application is running can be part of the classification.
This can be realized when the countermeasure creates a
Control Flow Graph (CFG) during initial configuration
and then monitors when syntactically-correct, though
functionally invalid, paths are attempted, such as during
code reuse attacks.
The selection of an approach depends on the application and
environment. Forming signatures requires specific knowledge
of the attack to form a blacklist, or knowledge of all valid (ac-
ceptable) applications to form a whitelist. Heuristics are used
when this knowledge is less specific, and general knowledge
of trends are available through monitoring of the system to
set guidelines, e.g., thresholds. Machine learning becomes a
better alternative when the system needs to adapt to unknown
threats or the execution environment is too dynamic to predict
anomalous behavior.
C. Notes for IoT and Embedded Systems
Embedded systems and systems that comprise the Internet
of Things (IoT) usually have the characteristics of limited
resources, such as memory, processing power, and network
bandwidth. IoT specifically may also include high deploy-
ment where many devices are managed. The use of HPCs
for countermeasures are still a viable alternative for these,
perhaps more so due to the low overhead of HPCs, though
the following points should be considered.
1) Some embedded systems may have limited HPCs avail-
able, especially in custom or application specific imple-
mentations.
2) The use of black/white lists may require too much
storage and the use of machine learning algorithms
may require too much processing power. Heuristic ap-
proaches tend to work best, though when used alone
they may not provide adequate protection.
3) In deployments with many devices, a centralized
database or machine learning engine may be able to
offset some of the local limitations to provide good pro-
tection, providing that network bandwidth is available.
Distributed approaches may alleviate limitations when a
centralized authority is not practical.
4) Many embedded systems only run a limited selection
of applications and/or have static configurations. A
whitelist may be more practical and effective in these
cases.
D. Notes for Cloud Usage
Cloud usage and usage in Virtual Machines (VM) should be
possible as most VM hypervisors have the option of enabling
virtual HPCs. Cloud providers would need to enable this func-
tionality as it is usually not enabled by default. Otherwise, the
use of HPCs for countermeasures should be largely transparent
to the cloud provider and users. When HPCs are enabled in
VMs, it should be ensured that the HPC values presented to the
VM OS are only for that VM’s activities, which is usually the
case and again, managed by the hypervisor. Cloud providers
may choose to enable these methods rather than rely on users’
requests.
E. Structure of this Paper
Section I introduces the topic of cyber attack detection via
HPCs, discusses similar surveys, and includes notes on specific
application areas. Section II discusses the types of attacks, i.e.
attack categories, including their capabilities and how they
are carried out. Section III analyzes several example cyber
attack countermeasures using HPCs, categorizing these by
countermeasure approach. Section IV provides a summary of
this analysis with insights into countermeasure characteris-
tics, implementation, and hybridization of multiple counter-
measures that may be utilized for more complete detection
coverage while mitigating false positives and false negatives.
Finally, Section V discusses future directions for HPC-based
countermeasures.
II. TYPES OF CYBER ATTACKS AND ATTACK VECTORS
The types of cyber attacks possible have been well covered in
the literature. A brief summary of cyber attack categories is
provided in Fig. #1.
Code Reuse Attacks (CRA) that compromise control flow
integrity seek to alter the normal control flow of a software
application to perform malicious activities. Examples include
Return Oriented Programming (ROP), in which the attacker
gains control of the call stack to rewrite the return address
from a function call, and Jump Oriented Programming (JOP),
in which the attacker maliciously uses the jump instruction
to piece together malicious code fragments. The attack uses
existing instructions in executable code or resident libraries
that are chained together to form gadgets. These gadgets are
similar to functions, i.e., sets of instructions, that are used to
perform the malicious activity of the attacker. In most cases,
the attacker needs to know the executable code and libraries
from which to select gadgets. For commodity operating sys-
tems and applications, these are known to the attacker. Address
space layout randomization, e.g., code randomization, is an
effort to make this more difficult. Also, side channel leaks
may allow an attacker to uncover enough information from
which to build useful gadgets anyway. Such CRA mitigation
has been a primary focus of HPC-based countermeasures as
the HPC information collected, such as cache misses, branch
mis-predictions, etc., are good heuristic indicators of CRA
where control flow becomes detectably anomalous.
False Code Injection (FCI) and modification attacks seek
to inject a malicious software payload or overwrite existing
application code with such a payload to perform malicious
activities. Many of these are done via buffer overflows, and
may be performed by other various means. In some cases,
false data may be injected to alter program behavior, such as
false sensor readings in process control systems. The goals
of such attacks may be to seize control, sabotage, or to
damage the system being attacked so as to interfere with
the performance of its mission. HPC countermeasures for
these generally look for anomalous behavior, i.e., contrary to
the valid functioning of the application software. Depending
on the code overwritten, the counts for various errors may
dramatically increase in a short time, e.g., buffer overflow
events.
Information leakage attacks seek to steal information from the
target system. Usually, these are passwords or other secrets,
and may be executable code fragments in preparation for a
code reuse attack. Side channel leakage is the most common
vector using cache operation attacks such as flush+reload[7],
evict+time, prime+probe, and evict+reload. HPCs can detect
these from excessive cache misses. HPCs may also monitor
event counts for correlation with secret keys when attackers
seek to employ HPCs in side channel attacks. Due to the high
level of detail HPCs can provide, some attackers may exploit
HPCs, for example, to leak the secret key when encryption
operations are performed. Martin et al. [8] have proposed
disabling or adding noise to HPCs to reduce their accuracy
and subsequent efficacy in an effort to prevent attackers from
leveraging these.
In other scenarios, more specific hardware events such as
memory corruption by rowhammer, which repeatedly accesses
(hammers) RAM in a very atypical manner to induce errors in
adjacent memory cells, may occur and be detected by HPCs
acting as hardware monitors based on RAM access. Some
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks may also be detected by
HPCs noting that most event counts for normal operation often
differ greatly from operation during a DoS, which is typically
characterized by extremely high activity.
III. APPROACHES TO ATTACK DETECTION
From the list of approaches for attack detection in the previous
section, several specific examples are examined to establish the
current state of the art in HPC cyber security countermeasures.
A. Signature Based Examples
Three signature based examples, SIGDROP[9], ConFirm[10],
[11], and another by Chiappetta et al.[12] are examined in their
use of HPCs to detect cyber attacks. SIGDROP focuses on
detecting Return Oriented Programming (ROP) attacks using
two characteristics of such attacks. The first is a high level of
mis-prediction by the Return Address Stack (RAS) due to the
attackers mis-direction in returns. The second characteristic
is that of calls to functions that are very short in instruction
length, i.e., gadgets, that are artificially crafted from existing
code to perform attack functions. Many such gadgets must
be chained together to perform useful work for the attack,
thus long chains of very short functions are another signature.
Recent studies show that most ROP gadgets have fewer than
6 instructions [13], [14], [15] and may require chaining of
dozens to hundreds of gadgets to perform an attack function.
SIGDROP configures hardware performance counters to count
if the number of consecutive return address predictor misses is
above a threshold, TM , and compares this to the total number
of return instructions, NR. If these are nearly equal, then the
return address predictor is missing almost all the time, which
is one of the characteristics of a ROP attack. A HPC is also
configured to count total instructions executed, NI , to check
the average number of instructions per missed return address
prediction. Noting that the typical number of instructions per
gadget or per return is TI ≤ 6 for ROP attacks, the second
signature is found by NI ≤ (TI × TM ), which is true when
the total number of instructions is less than or equal to the
typical ROP gadget length times the number of return address
predictor misses. Thus, SIGDROP is an example of a blacklist
signature approach. The blacklist behavior is determined by
comparison against known attacks.
Fig. 1. Types of cyber attack.
ConFirm[10], [11] uses hardware performance counters to
detect malicious software either injected into firmware or by
performing CRAs using firmware code. ConFirm is a whitelist
signature approach since firmware is known in advance and
rarely changes. ConFirm performs HPC checks at various
points in the firmware code execution process to determine
if configured HPCs are at typical values. Since the same code
always executes under normal circumstances, these should be
very consistent. An attack would introduce new operations and
thus change the HPCs. The whitelist behavior is determined
by profiling the valid code (firmware) prior to deployment
(offline) to collect good HPC values and determine optimal
checkpoints.
Chiappetta et al.[12] proposed using HPCs to detect side
channel attacks, specifically on cache memory to compromise
encryption through information leakage, such as flush+reload.
The countermeasure employs a utility, quickhpc, that allows
the HPC to be queried much faster, at microsecond resolution.
Under normal circumstances, the encryption process would
be expected to benefit from the cache for a significant por-
tion of the process time. However, when under attack the
encryption process never benefits from the cache, because
the flush+reload side channel attack is constantly flushing the
cache and timing the reload to determine program flow of the
encryption process. These cache misses are collected by the
HPC which can signal anomalous operation. If using simple
threshold heuristics, there could be many false positives, so
Chiappetta employs simple machine learning to determine a
signature for the encryption process. This is another example
of a whitelist approach that uses unsupervised training.
B. Heuristic Based Examples
Heuristic based examples, such as ANVIL[16],
CacheShield[17], by Lui et al.[18], by Torres et al.[19],
and Eunomia[20], provide direct detection of attacks when
certain events count past preset thresholds, either individually
or in some combination. These tend to perform better when the
effects of attacks are more generally known, e.g., when jump
oriented attacks result in high branch mis-predictions. These
may result in a higher number of false positives depending on
the process being executed, especially when there is a wide
range of potentially valid processes. However, they are simple
to implement and can act as a pre-filter for more advanced
and resource consuming detection approaches. ANVIL
is a Linux-based kernel module to mitigate rowhammer
attacks, specifically new forms of rowhammer that seek
to evade simple rowhammer countermeasures that DRAM
manufacturers are now employing, such as on-DRAM caches.
ANVIL works by monitoring the locality of DRAM row
accesses out of the LLC misses (LONGEST LAT CACHE.MISS).
Once a preset threshold of LLC misses is exceeded, a second
stage of detection samples virtual addresses for a time
duration using Load Latency (MEM TRANS RETIRED.LOAD
LATENCY) and Precise Store (MEM TRANS RETIRED.PRECISE
STORE) events to determine locality. Once an attack is
detected, the rows adjacent to the rows being attacked are
refreshed through a read operation. This is only performed
as needed so that false positives have very little effect on
the system. Thresholds can be determined by observation of
bit flips, and may also be empirically set based on DRAM
specifications.
CacheShield[17] is designed to be a user-level tool, with
low performance impact for legacy systems, that specifically
targets cache attacks. Cache misses, a common symptom of
cache attacks, are counted using various cache miss HPCs.
CacheShield is configured by monitoring known valid and
malicious applications to determine cache miss thresholds for
detection, and selects the specific HPCs that are most affected
for the application. The example given in the paper was for
OpenSSL and the L3 cache. A cache attack is detected when
an abrupt change in the statistical distribution of cache misses
occurs.
Lui et al.[18] developed a countermeasure to stack buffer
overflow attacks used to compromise control flow integrity. A
two-level approach is used with the first level being a heuristic
pre-filter to facilitate low overhead on embedded systems.
Stack buffer overflow attacks redirect control flow through
dynamically overwriting the return address of a procedure,
which results in instruction cache misses and mis-prediction of
return addresses. Anomalous behavior is detected when these
occur above an established threshold.
Torres et al.[19] investigated if data-only exploits could be
detected at runtime with HPCs. Examples of data oriented at-
tacks are SQL injections or any other mis-information whereby
malformed data sent to a host causes the host to disclose secret
information. The Heartbleed attack, studied specifically in this
work, uses an overestimate of the size of keep-alive packets
that keep secure channels open, causing the host to respond
with extra data, which contain sensitive information.
Eunomia[20] is another example of earlier work that is similar
to these where deviations in PMU-event counts signal mali-
cious activity versus valid processes. This paper includes a
good quantitive discussion of HPC deviation values in general
under attack scenarios for reference.
C. Examples of Machine Learning and Context Sensitivity
Machine learning includes most approaches in the area of
artificial intelligence. Learning may be supervised, such as
training HPC data against known valid and known malicious
applications. This learning is usually offline, i.e., the classi-
fication engine for detecting malicious behavior is developed
before runtime or deployment. Learning may also be unsu-
pervised, such as online during runtime based on accumulated
information, e.g., information from HPCs. Security policy may
still be specified for unsupervised learning and the classi-
fication engine will learn violations to this policy. Context
sensitivity implies knowledge of the operating environment
or application. This knowledge may include information from
the source or binary code such as the proper execution paths,
e.g., control flow graph verification, or mathematical rules,
such as those extracted from the code or based in physics
for physical processes, to validate proper operation of the
compiled application. Instrumentation of the binary may be
performed to provide checkpoints within the application to
facilitate these checks. Knowledge of the user environment
may be used to detect deviation from expected user behaviors,
or even the behaviors of the machine hardware.
The goal of machine learning is to provide a more advanced
detection scheme that eliminates the false positives from
simple signatures and heuristics as well as eliminating the false
negatives when sophisticated attacks are launched that use
valid code fragments and other seemingly valid approaches.
Machine learning is typically of much higher processing over-
heads and is often deployed as a second layer to a signature
or heuristic first layer, which acts as a pre-filter to minimize
the performance impact.
Torres et al.[19] performed a survey of approaches that were
essentially intelligent outlier rejection. The desired approach
characteristic was unsupervised learning by using collected
HPC data only, i.e., a data-driven approach. Cache misses
and branch mis-predictions were common variables studied.
During runtime, HPC data was collected for specific intervals
(1ms, 10ms, 100ms) with the assumption that valid activity
was more common (normal) and that invalid activity (attacks)
would be statistical outliers to the HPC data. The counter-
measure behaved similarly to heuristic analysis without the
necessity of pre-determining heuristic thresholds. The machine
learning portion would build a model in memory of the valid
state space as the statistical norm.
HPCMalHunter[21] dynamically monitors HPC data to clas-
sify malicious behavior. This approach uses supervised learn-
ing and offline pre-training to build a database for classi-
fication. The HPC data assembled into vectors (monitored)
in the example were: Branch instructions retired (BIR), load
instructions retired (LIR), store instructions retired (SIR), and
mis-predicted branch instructions (MBI). The database is a
matrix and HPC event data is formatted as a vector input for
classification, similar to an artificial neural network except by
a Support Vector Machine[22] (SVM) in this case. As HPC
data are typically very sparse, the SVM matrix is optimized by
Single Value Decomposition (SVD) to reduce its dimension-
ality and reduce storage and processing overheads resulting in
the final classification engine. This particular countermeasure
examined HPC data in blocks of 100,000 machine instructions,
and the span of examining multiple HPC data (BIR, LIR, SIR,
MBI) facilitated a very low false positive rate.
Nomani et al.[23] developed an Artificial Neural Network
(ANN) classifier to determine the phase of a running applica-
tion as a countermeasure against side channel attacks. Here,
side channel attacks refer to attacks that attempt to capture
secret information or perform malicious activities on shared
resources. Phase refers to the types of resources and functional
units that are utilized at that time, such as a memory phase
during high memory accesses, a floating point phase during
floating point operations, an integer phase, etc. When multiple
applications, or an application and a malicious program, share
resources, the potential for an attack is much higher[24], and
thus monitoring should be more vigilant. The ANN provides a
black-box approach to determining the phase in which running
applications reside or are in transition and purposely influences
the OS scheduler to avoid scheduling other applications on the
same processor using the same functional resources. Contrary
to increasing overhead, the countermeasure on average reduced
resource load by as much as 25% in some cases as a side
benefit. Once trained via supervised learning, the ANN was
able to perform classification well under the average time
between context switches allowing the scheduler sufficient
time to recalculate thread scheduling in most cases.
Alam et al.[25] developed a countermeasure that employed two
novel methods. The first was consideration that lots of HPC
data were known or could be generated for valid applications,
while HPC data for attacks were rare or would be unknown
due to zero-day attacks. Therefore, a single-class SVM was
developed to only classify valid behavior. The failure to
classify valid behavior determined potential invalid (malicious)
behavior. The behavior was further analyzed to select the
most likely HPC variables for attack classification based on
how the anomalous behavior deviated from valid behavior.
The second novel method used in the countermeasure was
Dynamic Time Warping[26] (DTW). HPC data represent time
series of various event counts, such as cache misses. A side
channel attack may seek to exploit HPCs by superimposing the
secret key or other sensitive information on these time series
through seemingly benign operations to exfiltrate the sensitive
information. Therefore, these time series (HPC events) are
monitored and correlated with sensitive information to see if
there is a match. The DTW algorithm allows detection even
when the time series is compressed, stretched, or scaled with
respect to the sensitive information pattern.
BehavioR based Adaptive Intrusion detection in Networks[27]
(BRAIN) is a countermeasure for distributed Denial of Ser-
vice (DoS) attacks in networks. Most network-based DoS
countermeasures use heuristics on network traffic by exam-
ining packets for attack signatures or specific attack behavior.
BRAIN enhances this by adding HPC data in the analysis of
DoS attacks under the assumption that processors also behave
differently during such attacks. BRAIN is trained during idle
and normal operation as well as during known DoS attacks,
i.e., supervised and online. Network heuristics from traditional
approaches are combined with BRAIN’s HPC-based informa-
tion via unsupervised K-means clustering that is then used to
form a SVM for final classification. Claimed results are zero
false positives with 99.8% true positive detection, conditional
on the span of the DoS attack scenarios used in training.
FlowGuard[28] is a countermeasure approach worth men-
tioning here although it does not use HPCs. It does, how-
ever, utilize Intel Processor Trace[29], a debugging tool also
implemented in micro-architecture. FlowGuard uses machine
learning of control flow paths to form a valid Control Flow
Graph (CFG). It then compresses the CFG information in the
same format as that supplied by Intel Processor Trace to allow
rapid, direct comparison of runtime control flow with these
learned valid paths. Paths are ranked with the most common
paths ranked highest. During runtime, deviation from valid
paths will indicate an anomaly and potential attack that can
then be examined with additional analysis, such as a hybrid
approach with HPCs.
IV. COMPARISON OF COUNTERMEASURE APPROACHES
In this section, a comparison of countermeasures approaches
as exemplified in Section III is given. Table II tabulates
the examples given in Section III with respect to name and
citation, HPCs utilized, the general category also from Section
III, and the types of attacks for which that example is good
for detecting. Table III provides a comparison of the general
categories with respect to characteristics of countermeasures
within that category and application notes that fit that cate-
gory. Figure 2 illustrates the process flow of countermeasure
categories and how multiple approaches may be used in hybrid
configurations.
The following terms are used in Table II. Branch instructions
retired (BIR), load instructions retired (LIR), store instructions
retired (SIR), and mis-predicted branch instructions (MBI),
Processor Management Unit events (PMU), Code Reuse At-
tacks (CRA), Machine Learning (ML), self-directed Outlier
Rejection (OR), Support Vector Machine (SVM), Single value
Decomposition (SVD), Artificial Neural Network (ANN), Dy-
namic Time Warping (DTW), Control Flow Graph (CFG),
and Return Oriented Programming (ROP). General attack
effectiveness, usually in machine learning, implies the coun-
termeasure is used to detect general attack behavior versus a
specific class. Chooses by learning implies the countermeasure
selects HPCs that are best suited, i.e. most affected, by the
attack class to be detected.
†Torres et al. incorporates both heuristic and machine learning
aspects to its approach.
In Fig. 2, attacks of all types, as denoted in Fig. 1, enter
the target system. Signature countermeasures, Section III-A
scan attack activity in various HPCs for specific patterns.
The assumption is that known attacks impact various counters
in a predictable and repeatable manner. Another approach
may be the use of heuristics, Section III-B. Heuristics look
for anomalous activity in HPCs as the exceeding a preset
threshold. These are usually quick and simple in implemen-
tation. Machine learning approaches, Section III-C, may be
utilized through any number of more advanced approaches.
Any one of these may be used as a first layer of detection
of cyber attack. Hybrid approaches will use one or more
of these as a pre-filter in combination with one or more of
these at a second layer of detection in an effort to mitigate
false positives/negatives, incorporate intelligent approaches,
and minimize resource requirements by reserving complex
countermeasure activities only after passing through simpler
pre-filtering. A typical hybrid approach would be using a
heuristic as a pre-filter at the first layer and (&) using machine
learning for further analysis at the second layer.
TABLE II
EXAMPLES OF HPC COUNTERMEASURES.
Name Category HPCs used Attacks targeted
SIGDROP [9] signature return address predictor misses, total
number of return instructions
ROP and other CRAs
ConFirm [10],
[11]
signature various HPCs, code instrumentation
via checkpoints
malicious software injected into
firmware or CRAs using firmware
Chiappetta et al.
[12]
signature cache misses and high speed HPC
query
side channel attacks, cache memory,
information leakage, e.g., flush+reload
ANVIL [16] heuristic LLC misses, Load Latency, Precise
Store
rowhammer
CacheShield [17] heuristic various cache misses cache attacks on legacy systems
Lui et al. [18] heuristic instruction cache misses and
mis-prediction
stack buffer overflow attacks
Torres et al. [19] † heuristic Cache misses and branch
mis-predictions
general, anything outside the norm,
Heartbleed
Eunomia [20] heuristic PMU events general
Torres et al. [19] † ML, OR Cache misses and branch
mis-predictions
general, anything outside the norm,
Heartbleed
HPCMal-
Hunter[21]
ML, SVM, SVD BIR, LIR, SIR, MBI general
Nomani et al. [23] ML, ANN HPCs by resource (memory, floating
point, integer, etc.)
general
Alam et al. [25] ML, SVM, DTW chooses HPCs from learning general
BRAIN [27] ML, k-means,
SVM
chooses HPCs from learning distributed denial of service
FlowGuard [28] ML, CFG Intel Processor Trace ROP and others that alter process flow
TABLE III
COMPARISON OF HPC COUNTERMEASURE CATEGORIES.
Category Characteristics/requirements Application (Use cases)
Signature memory intensive, not adaptive, training of signatures,
simple
specific/known attacks and apps, black-
list/whitelist
Heuristic minimal footprint, generally quickest, tuning of thresh-
olds, false posi/negatives may be higher
when general behaviors are known, attack
exceeds some threshold
Machine learn-
ing
generally largest footprint, potentially best with minimal
false posi/negatives, context sensitivity
dynamic/unknown attack and app behaviors,
deep attacks, zero day attacks
Hybrid large footprint offset by filtering (multi-layer), minimal
impact with minimal false posi/negatives
when the combined features of two or more
countermeasure layers is beneficial
V. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
From this survey, hardware performance counters have already
been used in a variety of cyber attack countermeasure ap-
proaches. In most cases, they are an existing resource and
implemented in on-chip in separate hardware, thus minimizing
their impact both on application performance and in applica-
tion development.
The motivations for including HPCs in micro-architecture
have been towards improved debugging and application sta-
bility. If additional micro-architectural features are incorpo-
rated that have cyber security as a primary mission, more
approaches may be possible in the near future. Additional
micro-architectural approaches already available include ex-
ecution and information flow monitoring, e.g., Intel Processor
Trace[29], built in self tests, subroutines from Joint Test Action
Group (JTAG) interfaces, and others. Also of note are the in-
creasing reliance on cloud systems and computing as a service.
In the same method of using micro-architectural approaches,
hypervisor based approaches should also be examined. Re-
search should continue in such approaches as an additional
front in the prevention of cyber attacks, especially noting the
Fig. 2. Summary of HPC countermeasures.
ever increasing footprint of software based approaches. As the
number and complexity of attacks increases, these applications
utilize more resources and become more difficult to develop
and manage.
While cyber attacks are increasing in number and sophisti-
cation, the vast majority of these are still not able to per-
form much malicious activity without leaving basic hardware
signatures, such as missed branch predictions, cache misses,
hammering of rows, etc. HPC based countermeasures need to
move out of research and into to the mainstream of attack
detection software as quickly as possible. In cases where a
hardware/software system configuration is completely known,
HPCs could theoretically detect most any direct attack. In
many cases, side channels can be detected as well, e.g.,
Dynamic Time Warping.
A. Special Note Meltdown and Spectre
Currently, the cyber attacks of Meltdown and Spectre [30]
have emerged at the micro-architectural level. In Meltdown, an
attack attempts an unauthorized read of privileged memory, to
which it is not allowed access. Though the processor will even-
tually deny access to this memory, it will still fetch and in most
cases perform some processing, i.e., speculative processing,
with this memory. The attacker then attempts to intercept this
information or the result prior to failing the privilege check, or
in some cases as a residual after the privilege check. HPCs that
count privilege check violations, if developed, might indicate
this attack. Spectre is a more generalized class of vulnera-
bilities similar to Meltdown, focusing on branch prediction.
In speculative execution schemes, both branch options may
be followed until the correct branch is finally determined.
The processor would then discard the mis-predicted branch,
though side effects of this would remain and encourage a
side channel attack. These types of branch mis-predictions are
common whether the attack is present or not, i.e., the attack
does not cause these mis-predictions. Some mitigations involve
preventing out of order execution for vulnerable processes, but
this carries significant performance impacts. Perhaps future
work in HPCs as cyber attack countermeasures could employ
multiple event counts to selectively classify Meltdown and
Spectre attacks since HPCs work at the micro-architectural
level with these attacks.
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